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things differently than the federal government.  Sometimes a 
state method is better.”1 
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 1. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Feichtinger, 994 P.2d 376, 389 
(Alaska 1999) (Matthews, J., dissenting).  Sometimes a state method could be worse, but 
it is nevertheless the state’s prerogative to legislate, as in a marriage, for better or for 
worse.  There are excellent examples of states leading the way for positive change: 
Long before the national government acted, a number of states abol-
ished slavery, extended the right to vote to women, African-
Americans, and 18-year-olds, and provided for the direct election of 
U.S. senators, among other reforms. These state actions expanded the 
promise of democracy at a time when none of these measures com-
manded a national consensus. In this sense, states serve as both po-
litical reformers and mediators, testing new ideas and helping to 
hammer out acceptable compromises among state and national ma-
jorities. 
D. Bodenhamer, Federalism and Democracy (Nov. 2001) (U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of 
Int’l Info. Programs), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/democracy/ 
dmpaper4.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Under the dual sovereignty established by our federalist frame-
work,2 state courts have a vital constitutional role to fill.  The “axiom” 
has long been recognized that “under our federal system, the states pos-
sess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject 
only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”3  Maintaining 
and promoting state sovereignty by developing a body of state constitu-
tional law that gives independent application and purpose to the Alaska  
Constitution has been a challenge for the Alaska courts.  Nevertheless, 
Alaska has made substantial inroads in this regard.  At times, the Alaska 
courts have clearly—if not boldly—departed from federal constitutional 
standards, developing a truly independent state constitutional doctrine.  
Other times, however, the Alaska courts have missed opportunities for 
developing Alaska constitutional law in favor of unnecessary deference 
to federal constitutional standards. 
This Article posits that state courts are obligated to advance and 
develop the state constitution as a primary source for interpreting state 
law, and should therefore defer to federal constitutional standards only 
when required to do so by the Supremacy Clause.  Absent Supremacy 
Clause concerns, state courts need not interpret or apply federal constitu-
tional provisions unless they are both textually and historically consis-
tent with state constitutional law and policy and provide worthy guid-
ance.  The position of this Article mirrors an early court doctrine first 
enunciated in Baker v. City of Fairbanks 4 and will be referred to as the 
Baker Doctrine. 
This Article reviews the current status of the nascent doctrine of in-
dependent state constitutional law and explores areas in which the 
Alaska courts have succeeded in giving life to the state constitution.  The 
Article evaluates selected cases in which the Baker Doctrine was appro-
priately applied and touches upon other cases in which it was needlessly 
overlooked in favor of federal supremacy.5 
 
 2. “Federalism is a system of shared power between two or more governments with 
authority over the same people and geographical area.” Bodenhamer, supra note 1. 
 3. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
 4. 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970). 
 5. Evaluating the implementation of the Baker Doctrine presents some challenges, 
because the doctrine applies only to cases that can be resolved solely on state constitu-
tional issues.  Id.  Some of these cases present both state and federal constitutional is-
sues, while others present issues that implicate only the Alaska Constitution.  For exam-
ple, Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution addresses natural resources and is unique to 
the constitution.  See, e.g., Native Village of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999) 
(discussing the “sustained yield clause of the Alaska [C]onstitution” within article VIII, 
§ 4).  In the area of natural resources, the state has developed a body of constitutional 
law that has no parallel to the federal constitution, including applying a form of equal 
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This Article also takes note of the heightened form of federalism 
recently promulgated by the United States Supreme Court.  Known as 
the “New Federalism,” this doctrine expands both the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and does so in a 
manner that reduces federal supremacy and elevates, or at least equal-
izes, state law.  Finally, this Article juxtaposes Alaska’s efforts in estab-
lishing its own constitutional doctrines within this new form of height-
ened federalism and contends that this combination provides the state 
with a significant opportunity to advance its independent state constitu-
tional doctrines and continue with the development of state constitu-
tional standards. 
II.  A REVIEW OF THE NEW FEDERALISM 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the New 
Federalism doctrine comprehensively, a brief overview is necessary to 
provide context for the Baker Doctrine and to understand more thor-
oughly the opportunity presented to state courts to expand upon state 
constitutional principles. The starting points for a discussion of the New 
Federalism doctrine are the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy 
Clause of the Federal Constitution. 
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”6  The Supremacy 
Clause provides: 
 
protection analysis relative to the utilization of natural resources. See Gilbert v. State, 
803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990) (creating an equal protection test under the “uniform 
application clause” of the state constitution); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 429 (Alaska 
1998) (applying equal protection analysis under the uniform application clause and stat-
ing that the court will “interpret the Uniform Application Clause to require legislation 
dealing with natural resources to satisfy a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny”).  
However, not every case that discusses federal, as well as state, constitutional provisions 
overlooks the Baker Doctrine, since some cases refer to federal law simply for compari-
son and rest the holding solely on state grounds.  Further, some cases do not involve any 
aspect of state constitutional law, but address state statutory law vis-à-vis federal statu-
tory law, with the Supremacy Clause being the only constitutional consideration.  See, 
e.g., Cline v. Cline, 90 P.3d 147, 153–54 (Alaska 2004) (discussing federal preemption 
of state court jurisdiction to treat military retirement benefits in excess of fifty percent of 
the benefit as marital property, stating that the “supremacy clause of the federal constitu-
tion requires that state courts defer to federal law.  Because allowing the superior court’s 
decision to stand would violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, we must 
require the property division to be retroactively modified to the extent that the division 
exceeds the fifty percent federal limit on state jurisdiction.”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  This is not to suggest, however, that the Tenth Amend-
ment is the only limitation on excessive federal power.  The majority in Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) noted: 
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding.7 
The Tenth Amendment both counter-balances the Article IV Supremacy 
Clause, which otherwise would eviscerate any true state autonomy, and 
provides express textual support for the primacy of state law, where not 
otherwise countermanded by the Federal Constitution. 
State constitutional principles must therefore always observe any 
federal constitutional provision or federal law, and state court judges are 
mandated to “be bound thereby.”8  However, three areas exist in which 
the states can develop and assert state-based principles independent of, 
and potentially superior to, federal law.  First, states can use any federal 
law as a floor; the states are free to create standards that exceed federal 
minimums.9  Second, the Federal Constitution and federal laws do not 
speak to every issue,10 and states are thus free to address the many areas 
in which federal law is silent.11  Third, and most complex, state law may 
trump any federal law that exceeds federal constitutional parameters.12 
 
Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provi-
sions, and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point 
explicitly. It is not at all unusual for our resolution of a significant constitu-
tional question to rest upon reasonable implications.  See, e.g., Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (finding that the President has the sole authority to 
remove executive officers under the Federal Constitution by an implication 
arising from Art. II, 1, 2); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 
(1995) (finding that Article III implies a lack of congressional power to set 
aside final judgments). 
Printz, 521 U.S.  at 923 n.13. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Federalism mandates that the states may develop their own laws and public poli-
cies with different standards as long as these laws satisfy federal constitutional mini-
mums.  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). 
 10. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 33 (1977) (finding no preemption 
under the Supremacy Clause because Congress had not legislated in the area). 
 11. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that 
“[t]he assumption [is] that the historic powers of the States [are] not superseded by . . . 
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”). 
 12. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 911 (1997) (emphasizing that 
there are some powers that belong to the states exclusively, in the absence of a constitu-
tional delegation of power to the federal government, and in such areas Congress cannot 
“impose . . . responsibilities without the consent of the States”). 
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A. The Supremacy Clause and Its Limits 
The drafters of the Federal Constitution envisioned that federal 
power would be circumscribed to limited subject matters only.13  State 
law-making power was viewed not just as a default to federal law, but 
rather a central tenet to the implementation of dual federalism: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal 
Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be 
exercised principally on external objects, such as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce. . . . The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and 
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.14 
The intended structure expressly provides states with law-making pow-
ers that “are numerous and indefinite,” whereas federal law-making 
powers are to remain “few and defined.”15 It is established that “[e]very 
law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers 
enumerated in the Constitution.”16 
Balancing this constriction of federal power, however, is the need 
to have a large centralized government that enacts supreme law to create 
a unified government in areas expressly delegated to the federal gov-
ernment by the Constitution.  As explained by one court: 
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton sets forth how political power 
is to be divided in a Republic. He states that the laws of the larger po-
litical entity—into which smaller political societies agree to join—are 
to be the supreme law of the land. Were it otherwise, Hamilton con-
tinues, the agreement would be merely a treaty dependent on the good 
faith of the parties, and not a government. As a corollary, the acts of 
the larger society or the government must be pursuant to its constitu-
tional powers, because if not, he concludes, such acts, which would 
invade the residuary authority of the smaller societies, would consti-
 
 13. See Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that the 
Tenth Amendment establishes that the federal government possesses only the powers 
expressly conveyed to it by the Constitution, but also concluding that the Tenth Amend-
ment is not a substantive limitation on the federal government) (citing New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis 
added).  Other contemporaneous writings indicate that federal “powers extend only to 
matters respecting the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so that 
the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other matters.” Letter from Roger 
Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789,  at 99 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
 15. Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (finding that “[t]he 
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mis-
taken, or forgotten, the constitution is written”). 
 16. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). 
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tute a usurpation of power.  Beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland, 
federal courts have attempted to comply with the spirit of Hamilton’s 
view.17 
Obviously both state and federal courts have construed the Suprem-
acy Clause more broadly than Alexander Hamilton envisioned.18  Spe-
cifically, the past decades have lacked any definition of the limitation on 
the Federal Supremacy Clause.  However, a series of recent decisions 
together hint that federal constitutional limits to the Supremacy Clause 
do exist.19 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft20 offers one 
of the better modern explanations of dual sovereignty and the way in 
 
 17. Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
 18. For instance, the Alaska Supreme Court, in State v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 
2001), declared unconstitutional a regulation that denied to non-citizen legal aliens eligi-
bility to receive permanent fund dividends from the state.  Id. at 74.  The court found that 
the regulation violated the Supremacy Clause by “improperly exclud[ing] some legal 
aliens who were not precluded under federal law from forming the intent to remain re-
quired for PFD eligibility.”  Id. at 78.  In light of the fact that the dividends are purely a 
matter of state law and constitute a distribution of a portion of the state’s wealth to its 
citizens, as citizenship is defined by the state, id. at 69, the court’s reliance on federal 
law and the Supremacy Clause demonstrates an unduly broad application of federal su-
premacy by a state court.  The court in Andrade reasoned that “if Congress has not pre-
cluded all aliens not admitted for permanent residence from forming the intention to re-
main indefinitely, Alaska law must recognize that possibility in establishing the 
requirements for permanent fund dividend eligibility.”  Id. at 73.  The court failed to cite 
to any provision, statute, constitutional mandate or precedent to support its holding.  That 
the Constitution rests immigration issues solely with the federal government is indisput-
able.  Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).  But the issue in Andrade was determining 
who would be entitled to receive a state distribution.  Andrade, 23 P.3d at 69.  This is not 
a question of federal immigration law, and it cannot be said that federal supremacy com-
pelled this result, even though the result reached in Andrade itself is fair. 
 19. The decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), is one such exam-
ple.  In Printz, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, struck down provisions of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that imposed requirements on the state execu-
tive branch.  Id. at 910–11.  The majority reasoned in part that there was “no evidence” 
by the first Congress of any “assumption that the Federal Government may command the 
States’ executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization” 
and the majority found “some indication of precisely the opposite assumption.”  Id. at 
909.  Printz emphasized that there are some powers that belong to the states exclusively, 
in the absence of a constitutional delegation of power to the federal government, and in 
such areas Congress cannot “impose . . . responsibilities without the consent of the 
States.” Id. at 911.  The decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991), is 
another example of the courts limiting the scope of previously unchallenged federal gov-
ernment power. 
 20. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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which the constitutional design was intended to function.  In Gregory, 
the Missouri State Constitution, article V, section 26, provided that “[a]ll 
judges other than municipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy 
years.”21 Some state court judges challenged the state constitutional pro-
vision as violative of both the Federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 and Federal Equal Protection principles.22  Their chal-
lenge was denied, and in the process, the Court reiterated its explanation 
of dual sovereignty, as set forth in an 1869 decision: 
Over 120 years ago, the Court described the constitutional scheme of 
dual sovereigns: “‘[T]he people of each State compose a State, having 
its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to 
separate and independent existence,’. . . ‘[W]ithout the States in un-
ion, there could be no such political body as the United States.’ Not 
only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent 
autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, 
but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, 
and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the de-
sign and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and 
the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all 
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible States.”23 
According to the Court, dual sovereignty is structured to provide 
co-equal sovereignty between states and the federal government, with 
defined exceptions granted to the federal government for supremacy, and 
with the states retaining superior sovereignty in the remaining vast and 
largely undefined categories.24  This view was codified with the enact-
ment of the Tenth Amendment.  The Court recognized that “[t]he States 
thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our constitutional sys-
tem.”25  Although the states ceded power to the federal government, the 
states retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”26  Today, we 
operate under a system in which the “Framers rejected the concept of a 
central government that would act upon and through the States, and in-
 
 21. Id. at 455. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 457 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (quoting Lane 
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869))). 
 24. As reasoned by the Court in Printz, “[r]esidual state sovereignty was also im-
plicit, of course, in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental 
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered 
express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.’” Printz, 521 U.S. at 919. 
 25. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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stead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments 
would exercise concurrent authority over the people.”27 
Of importance to the states, and state courts, is the purpose under-
girding the structure of dual federalism.  The Court in Gregory stated: 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people 
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will 
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it in-
creases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; 
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and 
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in compe-
tition for a mobile citizenry. 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on 
abuses of government power. “The ‘constitutionally mandated bal-
ance of power’ between the States and the Federal Government was 
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental 
liberties.’” Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumula-
tion of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power 
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.28 
The purposes identified by the Gregory Court should be considered 
whenever a state court faces an issue of state law that may differ from, 
exceed, or duplicate federal law.  State courts should accordingly recog-
nize the presence of these concerns as factors warranting a holding based 
on state law.  The Supremacy Clause has given the federal government 
“a decided advantage in this delicate balance,” 29 as “Congress may im-
pose its will on the States” so long as it is legislating “within the powers 
granted it under the Constitution.”30  State courts should therefore focus 
their analyses on the determination of whether Congress is, in fact, act-
ing “within” its constitutional strictures.  When Congress legislates “in 
areas traditionally regulated by the States,” state courts should closely 
scrutinize the federal legislation to determine express congressional in-
tent and the appropriate constitutional textual basis supporting such con-
gressional intent.31  The preservation of dual sovereignty requires no less 
than an exacting scrutiny by state courts.  Undue deferential rationaliza-
tion to the potential supremacy of the federal government undermines 
the structure and feasibility of dual sovereignty and the federalist system 
overall. 
Under the decision in Gregory, federal legislation seeking to regu-
late the structure and operation of state government should be considered 
 
 27. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20. 
 28. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 460. 
 30. Id. at 458. 
 31. Id. at 460. 
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constitutionally infirm and violative of the notion of dual sovereignty.32  
The Gregory Court stressed that congressional intent to preempt state 
law should not be lightly inferred, explaining that “it is incumbent upon 
the federal courts33 to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that 
federal law overrides this balance [of dual sovereignty].”34  The Court 
further explained that “if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitu-
tional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must 
make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.’”35  Accordingly, courts need to determine congressional intent 
and should not assume, infer, or imply intent where none is expressed, 
particularly when legislation affects state powers and autonomy.36  Con-
 
 32. See id.  The Gregory Court stated: 
The present case concerns a state constitutional provision through which the 
people of Missouri establish a qualification for those who sit as their judges. 
This provision goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a 
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the 
structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise govern-
ment authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign. “It is obviously essential to 
the independence of the States, and to their peace and tranquility, that their 
power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers . . . should be exclu-
sive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by 
the Constitution of the United States.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 33. Nor is this obligation limited to the federal courts.  State courts have the duty to 
examine this issue in the same manner and to the same extent as any federal court.  Dual 
sovereignty requires as much. 
 34. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)). 
 35. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242 (quotations omitted)). 
 36. This can be seen in the newer application of the preemption doctrine.  The Court 
has emphasized its reluctance to extend the preemption doctrine to contexts other than 
the Labor Relations Management Act of 1947 (LRMA) and the Employment Retirment 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), emphasizing the few circumstances where com-
plete preemption should exist.  See Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) 
(Brennan, J. concurring) (emphasizing that “our decision should not be interpreted as 
adopting a broad rule that any defense premised on congressional intent to pre-empt state 
law is sufficient to establish removal jurisdiction and that the Court holds only that re-
moval jurisdiction exists when, as here, Congress has clearly manifested an intent to 
make causes of action . . . removable to federal court”) (emphasis in the original) (cita-
tions and quotations omitted)); BLAB v. T.V., 182 F.3d  851, 856 (11th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that, unlike the LRMA and ERISA’s very “unique preemptive force,” the terms of 
the Cable Act specifically anticipated state court jurisdiction, and that the text of the 
statute itself “counsels against a conclusion that the purpose behind the Cable Act was to 
replicate the ‘unique preemptive force’ of the LRMA and ERISA”); Whitt v. Sherman 
Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing that the Court has re-
strained the lower courts’ expansion of the complete-preemption doctrine). 
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gress is obligated to “make its intention ‘clear and manifest’ if it intends 
to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.’”37 
B. The Tenth Amendment: More Than a Restraint of Federal Power 
While the Supremacy Clause has garnered the most judicial atten-
tion and application, the Tenth Amendment provides an additional check 
on federal power, as well as an express textual delegation of powers to 
the states that equals or exceeds federal power in certain circum-
stances.38  The powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states 
formed the basis of Justice Brandeis’ dissenting view in New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann39 that the states are “laboratories” with sufficient 
autonomy and sovereignty to create a body of law independent of federal 
law.40  That view41 has been given life by the Court in numerous deci-
sions.42 
 
 37. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (finding that 
“[i]n traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the 
requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended 
to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision”). 
 38. “The text of the Tenth Amendment unambiguously confirms this principle.”  
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995).  It has been noted that the 
Tenth Amendment made a distinction between the powers of the then newly created fed-
eral government and 
the powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign States.  As Chief Justice 
Marshall explained, “it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers 
retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, 
but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the 
constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by 
that instrument.” 
Id. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193 (1819)).  Further, as dis-
cussed by the Court, “Hamilton’s reasoning in The Federalist No. 32” established that 
“the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they be-
fore had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”  Id. 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)) 
(emphasis in original). 
 39. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 40. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Matthews cited to Justice Brandeis’ 
reasoning in his opinion in Anchorage Police Dept. Employees Ass’n v. Feichtinger,  994 
P.2d 376, 389 (Alaska 1999). 
 41. One commentator contends that Justice Brandeis’ dissent and theoretical posi-
tion did not promote federalism as it is now touted, but represented a reflection of his 
personal political view favoring government regulation in general to engineer social 
change. See M. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Analysis of a Metaphor, 6 Federalist 
Outlook (May 2001) (American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research), avail-
able at http://www.federalismproject.org/outlook/5-2001.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2004).  Greve noted: 
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The Tenth Amendment also establishes a textual limitation on fed-
eral law-making power to ensure a dual system of federalism.43  As well 
recognized by the Court, even when Congress must act under “extraor-
dinary conditions,” it must still act within the confines of the express 
constitutional grants of power; the ends do not justify the means: 
Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the 
argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which 
lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.  Extraordinary con-
ditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.  The Constitu-
tion established a national government with powers deemed to be 
adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these 
powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional 
grants.  Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to tran-
scend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different 
power is necessary.  Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority 
were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth 
Amendment.44 
The principles contained in the Tenth Amendment were implicitly as-
sumed by the original drafters of the Constitution and codified later to 
eliminate any doubt that “the relationship between the national and state 
governments” would be preserved “as it had been established by the 
Constitution before the amendment.”45  As explained by the Court in 
United States v. Sprague,46 “[t]he Tenth Amendment was intended to 
confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to 
 
The New State Ice dissent assumed the rank of a canonical statement of feder-
alism’s innovative, experimental virtues. That interpretation, however—
testimony to the lasting dominance of Brandeis’s progressivist ideology—is 
unsustainable. The New State Ice majority employed judicial review as a 
coarse screen to filter permissible, public-regarding experimentation from na-
ked interest group dealing. What the dissent stands for is judicial abdication in 
the face of that spectacle. 
Id. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (holding that “[i]n 
this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States 
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions 
where the best solution is far from clear”) (citing San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932)).  Brandeis’ state laboratory theory as part of the Tenth Amendment limitations 
on federal power was noted both in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789 n.20 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J. concurring and dissenting in part) and in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 n.13 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 43. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528–29 (1935). 
 44. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 45. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 46. 282 U.S. 716 (1931). 
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the States or to the people.  It added nothing to the instrument as origi-
nally ratified . . . .”47 
Under this understanding of the Tenth Amendment, the proper 
questions for courts confronted with the issue of whether a federal law 
applies in a given case are the following: (1) whether the law makes an 
express representation of congressional intent to usurp state powers and 
state law, and (2) if so, whether a textual basis exists in the Constitution 
for this exercise of congressional power.  If either question is resolved 
negatively, both the Tenth Amendment and the principles of dual feder-
alism require a rejection of the federal law.  Moreover, it becomes ap-
parent that the Supremacy Clause cannot be used to bootstrap an other-
wise constitutionally infirm provision into constitutional supremacy vis-
à-vis the states, as the Supremacy Clause itself requires that Congress 
must have acted within its constitutional powers before it “may impose 
its will on the States.”48  Viewed in this light, the Supremacy Clause is a 
conditional guarantee of supremacy, not an absolute one.  The clause en-
sures supremacy only as long as the congressional enactment is made 
pursuant to an express delegation of power within the Constitution.49 
In practice, the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment have not established a truly co-equal or dual sovereignty 
system.  Although many examples exist of Congress and the federal 
courts checking potential abuses of state governments,50 it is impossible 
to find one state court decision or one state legislative enactment that at-
tempts, much less succeeds, in checking the alleged abuse or usurpation 
of power by the federal government.51 This arrangement is not a surpris-
ing one, as it embodies a comfortable status quo intellectually and judi-
cially; it is questionable, however, whether this should in fact be the 
status quo, particularly in light of the Court’s recent decisions. 
 
 47. Id. at 733; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 578–79 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. 
Cooke ed., 1961). 
 48. Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
 49. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (stating that “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined and lim-
ited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written”). 
 50. E.g., Brown v.  Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51. A notable recent example echoes the effort to try, however.  Political subdivi-
sions of a number of states have enacted resolutions condemning portions of the USA 
Patriot Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1365.  As of the time of this writing, 270 towns, 43 counties, and 
4 states had enacted resolutions condemning this Act. See American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, Main Street America Fights Back, at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree. 
cfm?ID=11256&c=206 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).  These efforts, meager though they 
may be, reflect the potential of the states to check the perceived excesses of the federal 
government. 
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It is certainly unlikely that this development was intended by the 
framers of the Constitution.  Alexander Hamilton expected the states to 
retain the ability to prevent federal usurpation of individual liberties, just 
as the federal government has the power to prevent state abuse of indi-
vidual liberties: “If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use 
of the other as the instrument of redress.”52  James Madison also imag-
ined the power of either government to rectify, stop, or prevent the abuse 
of power by the other: “Hence a double security arises to the rights of 
the people.  The different governments will control each other, at the 
same time that each will be controlled by itself.”53  As further explained 
by Justice O’Connor in Gregory, “[i]f this ‘double security’ is to be ef-
fective, there must be a proper balance between the States and the Fed-
eral Government. These twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if 
both are credible.  In the tension between federal and state power lies the 
promise of liberty.”54 
History, however, has demonstrated that there has been little, if any, 
“mutual restraint.”55  Instead, the overwhelming majority, if not the ex-
clusive source, of restraint of power has emanated from federal to state,56 
thus rendering illusory the principle of “mutual restraint.”  This failure 
of mutuality can, in all probability, be credited to the fallout from the 
Civil War.57  But now, over 140 years later, perhaps the time has come 
for the federal courts to relax their grip over the states and to allow the 
states to exercise mutual sovereignty as originally intended.58 
 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 53. Id.  NO. 51, at 350 (James Madison). 
 54. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991). 
 55. Id. 
 56. The U.S. Supreme Court has been the sole source of restraint against federal 
usurpation of power. See Bodenhamer, supra note 1 (“Although the Supreme Court, 
which by now was recognized as the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation, ac-
cepted and promoted this aim, it still attempted to keep federal power in check. Nonethe-
less, the general trend was clear: Federal authority grew in concert with national needs, 
and state power diminished correspondingly.”). 
 57. Id. (“The Civil War, fought over the question of slavery, settled the dispute 
about the nature of the union and the supremacy of the national government in it. It did 
not answer all the questions about the proper division of responsibility between central 
and state governments, even though the 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, contained 
language that permitted the legitimate expansion of national power.”). 
 58. The fear for some in doing this could be the resurrection of state-sponsored pro-
vincialism, discrimination, and other ill-motivated actions.  It would seem plain, how-
ever, particularly in light of both the post-Civil War amendments and present day sensi-
bilities and notions of fairness, that the expansion of state sovereignty would not result in 
the states’ return to 18th-Century prejudices.  There are many legitimate areas of state 
sovereignty that do not touch upon issues of discrimination that could provide a testing 
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The Supreme Court’s recent resurrection of the principle that states 
are co-equal sovereigns59 and its renewed recognition that the federal 
government is not an unrestrained oracle of truth, power, and auton-
omy60 indicates that the time has now come to test the waters of this 
New Federalism. The Court has restrained congressional legislative 
powers61 and, at the same time, reinvigorated the states’ historical au-
thority to establish their own regulatory or other legislative powers.62  In 
a series of decisions, the Court constricted the breadth of the Commerce 
Clause,63 as well as Congress’ powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.64 Additionally, the Court elevated the Tenth Amendment 
and interpreted it in a manner that constrains Congress’ ability to use the 
states to implement congressional legislative enactments simply by 
 
ground for the responsible assertion of state power, and, as suggested in Bodenhamer 
supra note 1, many states lead the way in progressive and enlightened changes. 
 59. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which breathed new life into the 
doctrine established under both United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and the In 
re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 60. For instance, the Court in United States v. Morrison reigned in congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause by striking down the Violence Against Women Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 13981.  529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).  The Court based its holding on an “eco-
nomic/noneconomic” distinction.  Id.  Many commentators have addressed this theory.  
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2231 (1998) (criticizing the Court’s enclave the-
ory); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 795, 
812 (1996) (stating that “the constitutional status of the principle of federalism does not 
necessarily depend on the existence of areas of exclusive state powers”). 
 61. Not all of the Court’s justices agree with this practice.  A sizable minority find 
the New Federalism to be both practically and theoretically in error.  See Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 617–18; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
 63. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act as 
legislation beyond the Congress’ legislative powers and violative of the 11th Amend-
ment); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (voiding portions of the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
of 1990 as violative of Congress’ textual powers). For additional discussion, see Scott 
Arceneaux, Federalism in the Balance, How the Supreme Court’s Recent Federalism 
Opinions Are Threatening To Upset the Delicate Balance Between the Federal Courts, 
Congress and the States, 47 LOY. L. REV. 797 (2001). 
 64. The Court’s recent consistency of holdings and frequency of decisions in this 
area, compared to the absence of either in the prior fifty years, suggests that a fundamen-
tal doctrinal shift has occurred.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as impermissibly in excess of Sec-
tion 5 of Congress’ 14th Amendment powers); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers 
of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 32 IND. L. REV. 163 (1998). 
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fiat.65 Finally, the Court has buttressed this invigorated federalism by 
giving states heightened protection under the Eleventh Amendment’s66 
sovereign immunity doctrine.67 
Despite periods of Court neglect, the Tenth Amendment was clearly 
intended to provide a substantive barrier to federal authority.  For in-
stance, in 1798, Thomas Jefferson explained that any federal act that was 
not authorized by the express powers delegated under the Constitution 
would be void.68  He wrote, “whensoever the general government as-
sumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no 
 
 65. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating sections of 
the Brady Act that forced state and local law enforcement agencies to assist the federal 
government in conducting background checks of prospective buyers); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that an interstate compact governing the 
disposal of hazardous waste violated the Tenth Amendment because “Congress may not 
commandeer the States’ legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program”). 
 66. The Eleventh Amendment, along with the Tenth Amendment and the enumer-
ated powers doctrine, is one of the “three pillars” ensuring state sovereignty.  In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has brought new attention to the Eleventh Amendment by 
striking down a variety of federal laws that sought to impose liability against the states. 
See Alden v Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
 67. For example, the following cases demonstrate a pattern of invalidating federal 
laws that subjected states to potential liability and elevating the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to a degree not seen since the 1930s:  Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (voiding certain provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act the Court found intruded upon state sovereign immunity from suit); Ki-
mel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (holding that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act was constitutionally infirm to the extent it attempted to 
eliminate state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding 
that the Fair Labor Standards Act was an unconstitutional intrusion into the Eleventh 
Amendment to the extent it attempted to recognize private suits for damages against non-
consenting states in state court); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding provisions of the Trademark Rem-
edy Clarification Act unconstitutional to the extent these provisions attempted to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Col-
lege Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 630 (1999) (using identical reasoning as above to strike 
portions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act to the ex-
tent directed at the states); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) 
(striking a portion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that permitted suit against 
states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding part of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act unconstitutional for overreaching). 
 68. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, 
J.B. Lippincott 1891). 
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force.”69  In light of the Court’s recent emphasis on the reserved powers 
of the states, each individual state, including Alaska, should reevaluate 
its respective state constitution and promote the development of state 
law independently of federal doctrine, grounded in the text and intent of 
the state constitution. 
III.  THE BAKER DOCTRINE: THE OBLIGATION OF STATE  
COURTS TO DEVELOP STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES  
FIRST AND USE FEDERAL LAW FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS 
In light of the federal Supremacy Clause, Alaska courts interpreting 
the state constitution are obligated only to ensure that minimum federal 
standards are met.70  Alaska courts are free to, and should, exceed these 
standards in the many instances in which the Alaska Constitution textu-
ally exceeds the Federal Constitution.71  An early decision of the Alaska 
Supreme Court, Baker v. City of Fairbanks,72 explained: 
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards im-
posed upon us by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to 
develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our 
Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges 
to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional lan-
guage and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered 
liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.73 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Lemon v. State, 514 P.2d 1151, 1154 n.5 (Alaska 1973) (explaining that the 
court may adopt its own interpretations of the Alaska Constitution if it meets the mini-
mum standards set by the United States Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution).  
When interpreting the state constitution, Alaska courts will “interpret the constitution 
and Alaska law according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account 
the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the drafters.”  Native 
Village of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999) (citing Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. 
Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 979 (Alaska 1997)). 
 71. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02; See also Valley Hosp. Ass’n 
v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 967 (Alaska 1997) (“[O]ur articulation of 
the protection of reproductive rights under Alaska’s constitution may be broader than the 
minimum set by the federal constitution.”); Shagloak v. State, 597 P.2d 142, 145 n.14 
(Alaska 1979) (“A state supreme court is not limited by the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court or by the federal constitution when interpreting the provisions of 
the state constitution, since the latter may have broader safeguards than the minimum 
federal standards.”). 
 72. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
 73. Id. at 401–02. 
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The Baker court thus laid the cornerstone on which independent Alaska 
constitutional law can be built.74 
The Baker Doctrine establishes a preference, if not an obligation, 
for Alaska courts to examine and expound upon Alaska constitutional 
law in lieu of, or certainly in addition to, federal constitutional law.75  As 
explained by the court: 
[W]e have recognized that we are at liberty to make constitutional 
progress in Alaska by our own interpretations, as long as we measure 
up to the national standards which are required by the United States 
Supreme Court.  It is our duty to move forward in those areas of con-
stitutional progress which we view as necessary to the development of 
a civilized way of life in Alaska.76 
The court further reasoned that, although federal constitutional mini-
mums must of course be observed, it is incumbent upon Alaska courts to 
decide cases based on the Alaska Constitution: “[doing otherwise] would 
be an abdication of our constitutional responsibilities to look only to the 
[U.S.] Supreme Court for guidance.”77 
 
 74. Although Baker was the first to explain the justification and need for creating an 
independent body of state constitutional law, a prior decision touched upon the issue and 
laid the foundation for future decisions. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342–43 (Alaska 
1969) (holding “[w]e are not limited by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or 
the United States Constitution when we expound our state constitution; the Alaska Con-
stitution may have broader safeguards than the minimum federal standards”); see also 
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 167 (Alaska 1972) (“[T]his court is not obligated to in-
terpret our constitution in the same manner as the Supreme Court of the United States 
has construed parallel provisions of the Federal Constitution”); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 
872, 876 (Alaska 1978) (“We may construe Alaska’s constitutional provisions as afford-
ing additional rights.”). 
 75. Notably, state courts have equal standing with lower federal courts when con-
struing federal constitutional law.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (stating that “[w]e agree with the state that the Supremacy 
Clause did not require the Illinois courts to follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting 
the Fifth Amendment. ‘In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state courts and 
the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position; there 
is a parallelism but not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same 
reviewing authority of the Supreme Court’”). 
 76. Baker, 471 P.2d at 401 (citation omitted). 
 77. State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925, 936 (Alaska 1971).  Justice Burke repeatedly 
stressed this reasoning during his tenure on the bench.  See, e.g., Robison v. Francis, 713 
P.2d 259, 271 (Alaska 1986) (Burke, J., concurring) (“When called upon to determine 
the constitutionality of an Alaska statute under both the state and federal constitutions, it 
is my belief that this court should consider first the requirements of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.”); Adams v. Pipeliners Union, 699 P.2d 343, 352 (Alaska 1985) (Burke, J., concur-
ring) (“Thus, our opinion should not be read as holding such quotas constitutional; their 
constitutionality, at least under the Alaska Constitution, remains an open question.”); 
Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska 1984) (Burke, J., concurring) (“Our duty, 
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A review of the Baker Doctrine’s application demonstrates the Su-
preme Court’s notable success in progressing well beyond federal con-
stitutional minimums. 
IV.  THE BAKER DOCTRINE APPLIED: NOTABLE  
CASES IN WHICH INDEPENDENT ALASKA STATE  
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS WERE CREATED 
Although only thirty-four years old, the Baker Doctrine has gained 
a strong foothold in the Alaska courts.  Several reasons may explain the 
relatively rapid growth of independent state constitutional law in Alaska: 
(1) the state is both geographically and culturally dissociated with the 
Lower 48, and its people demonstrate, in most areas, a strong penchant 
for individual autonomy;78 and (2) the federal government had an over-
whelming influence in pre-statehood days, including ownership of al-
most all land, which strongly compelled most Alaskans to seek “inde-
pendence” by becoming a state, and the state courts now guard that 
independence. 
In addition, the potential for independent state-based law is high in 
Alaska because the scope of the state courts’ constitutional review in 
Alaska is broad. 
The courts of the state of Alaska have the constitutional duty to re-
view actions by agencies of the state in order to ensure compliance 
with all provisions of the Alaska Constitution.  This function applies 
not only to coordinate branches of government such as the legislature 
and the executive branch but to component parts of the judiciary such 
as lower courts, and the grand jury.79 
In short, virtually any government action, by law, regulation, rule, or 
court order, is subject to constitutional review if questioned.  Accord-
ingly, there is no shortage of opportunity to develop state law independ-
ently of federal law. 
State courts gain distinct advantages by resting their decisions on 
independent state grounds.  In addition to fulfilling the expectations of 
dual federalism, when a state court rests its decision on state law, any 
 
as I see it, is to look first to the requirements of the Alaska Constitution.  If the protection 
sought is afforded by that document, it becomes irrelevant whether or not the same pro-
tection is provided by the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 78. Since the 1970s, the Alaska Independence Party, originally devoted to the seces-
sion of Alaska from the federal government, has regularly fielded candidates for office, 
and on one occasion won the gubernatorial office.  See Alaska Independence Party Plat-
form, available at http://www.akip.org/platform.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (describ-
ing one goal to “support and defend States’ Rights, Individual Rights, and the Equal 
Footing Doctrine as guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States of America and 
the state of Alaska”). 
 79. O’Leary v. Superior Court, 816 P.2d 163, 173 (Alaska 1991) (citations omitted). 
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federal review is thereafter more limited.80  To an extent, the federal 
courts lack jurisdiction to review a decision that rests solely on state 
law.81  It is recognized that “where the judgment of a state court rests 
upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in 
character, [federal court] jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is in-
dependent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judg-
ment.”82 This rule was first established to preclude federal authority to 
modify state-court judgments resting on an alternative state substantive 
ground.83  The doctrine grew and was extended to bar federal review of 
state judgments that rest on adequate and independent state procedural 
grounds.84 
The converse is also true; when a state court relies on both federal 
and state law, the federal courts may find jurisdiction to review the state 
court’s decision.85  In Michigan v. Long,86 for instance, the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered its jurisdiction to review a judgment of the 
Michigan Supreme Court that had ruled a search unlawful.87  Because 
the Michigan court had relied almost exclusively on federal decisions 
construing the Fourth Amendment, federal review was not precluded; 
the federal courts expressly adopted a presumption in favor of federal 
review “when . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily 
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the 
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear 
 
 80. Federal review is limited, if not eliminated, if the state court’s reasoning 
“rest[ed] on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate 
to support the judgment . . . [regardless of] whether the state law ground is substantive or 
procedural.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The federal courts follow 
a general principle that they will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and 
independent state law grounds. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). 
 81. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977) 
(“If the judgment below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, the writ of 
certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted.”). 
 82. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). 
 83. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 636 (1874). 
 84. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446–47 (1965). 
 85. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). See Fitzgerald v. Racing 
Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106 (2003) (“We have previously held that, in such 
circumstances, we shall consider a state-court decision as resting upon federal grounds 
sufficient to support this Court’s jurisdiction.”); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
588 n.4 (1990) (finding no adequate and independent state ground precluding federal re-
view when the state court says that state and federal constitutional protections are identi-
cal). 
 86. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 87. Id. at 1035. 
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from the face of the opinion.”88  Accordingly, state courts can ensure the 
better development of state law and protect the integrity of their judg-
ments by relying on state constitutional law when rendering decisions. 
Other reasons exist to independently expand Alaska constitutional 
law.  The Alaska Constitution, being relatively new in origin, contains 
textual provisions that could not have been, or were not, envisioned 
when the Federal Constitution was drafted.89  For example, Alaska’s 
“constitutional right to privacy finds no express counterpart in the fed-
eral constitution and has thus served as the basis for extending protec-
tions to Alaska citizens that are not extended under the United States 
Constitution.”90  The right to privacy is but one example.  The state con-
stitution also contains an entire article, article VIII, devoted to natural 
resources, a subject not mentioned in the Federal Constitution.91  As dis-
cussed below, Alaska courts have often given truly independent analysis 
and meaning to the Alaska Constitution, particularly in the areas of 
criminal law, individual rights, and civil liberties.92 
A. Alaska Has Created Greater State Constitutional Protections for 
Civil Liberties 
Civil liberty protections have experienced the best developments in 
truly independent Alaska constitutional law.  This trend is not coinciden-
tal since “[t]he ‘constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between 
 
 88. Id. at 1040–41.  The Court in Michigan v. Long determined that the federal court 
had jurisdiction to review the state court decision since the state court’s citation to fed-
eral law and precedent was not “being used only for the purpose of guidance” but instead 
was “compel[ling] the result.”  Id. 
 89. An obvious example is that the Federal Constitution makes no mention of an air 
force for the plain reason that controlled flight had not yet been invented.  Though never 
modified to add the raising of an “air force” as a congressional power, the fact that the 
federal government has an air force has never been questioned. 
In addition, it is established under Alaska law that even when the two constitutions 
contain identical provisions, it is not mandated that there should be identical results since 
the Alaska Constitution is generally deemed far more protective of individual rights and 
liberties than the Federal Constitution.  See Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 
404 (Alaska 2004); Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 641 (Alaska 1977) (“[T]he Alaska Su-
preme Court is not limited by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or by the 
United States Constitution when interpreting its state constitution.”). 
 90. State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 932 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
 91. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII. 
 92. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 967 (Alaska 
1997) (establishing much broader “protection of reproductive rights under Alaska’s con-
stitution” than the “minimum set by the federal constitution”); Doe, 92 P.3d at 404 (due 
process and privacy rights under the state constitution found to far exceed standards set 
in federal constitution); Matter of A.B., 791 P.2d 615, 621 (Alaska 1990) (comparing 
federal privacy standards to state constitutional standards). 
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the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to 
ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’”93 
The court in Doe v. Dep’t of Public Safety94 explained the height-
ened recognition of personal liberty under the state constitution and 
squarely rejected federal constitutional standards that proved too insuffi-
cient to satisfy Alaska’s greater protections of fundamental liberties: 
We have often recognized the importance of personal liberty under 
our constitution. “[A]t the core of this concept is the notion of total 
personal immunity from governmental control.” The right is not abso-
lute; its limits depend on a balance of interests that varies with the 
importance of the right infringed.  When the state encroaches on fun-
damental aspects of the right to liberty, it must demonstrate a compel-
ling government interest and the absence of a less restrictive means to 
advance that interest.95 
Applying these standards, the court found that the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act unconstitutionally required the convicted sex offender 
to register when his conviction had been set aside prior to enactment of 
the law.96  The court reasoned that the “set-aside conferred on Doe a 
fundamental right to be let alone with respect to the conviction that was 
being set aside,” and the state could not, consistent with notions of due 
process, require him to register.97 
Critical to our analysis here, the Doe court flatly rejected federal 
constitutional law standards that found no due process violation under 
the same circumstances.98  Instead, the court, relying on the Baker Doc-
trine, detailed the greater protection of personal liberty offered by the 
state constitution: 
State courts are not necessarily bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions when they consider issues of state constitutional 
law.  Only the Supreme Court’s decisions on issues of federal law, in-
cluding issues arising under the Federal Constitution, bind the state 
courts’ consideration of those issues. The Alaska Supreme Court is the 
final authority on whether an Alaska statute violates the Alaska Con-
stitution.  Doe’s appeal involves Alaska’s constitutional guarantee of 
due process. The Federal Constitution protects the due process rights 
of all Americans. But federal law does not preclude the Alaska Con-
stitution from providing more rigorous protections for the due process 
 
 93. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
 94. 92 P.3d 398, 405 (Alaska 2004). 
 95. Id. at 405 (citations omitted) (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 
(Alaska 1972)). 
 96. Id. at 408. 
 97. Id. The court held that because of the act’s “burden on Doe’s liberty interests 
and its interference with his settled expectations . . . the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process prevents the state from contradicting the judgment of the superior court 
and requiring Doe to” register.  Id. at 412. 
 98. Id. at 403. 
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rights of Alaskans.  When we interpret a provision in the Alaska Con-
stitution, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the corresponding provision in the Federal Constitu-
tion.  We may not undermine the minimum protections established by 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Federal Con-
stitution. But “we have repeatedly explained that we are free, and we 
are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privi-
leges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental 
rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local 
constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized 
life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heri-
tage.”99 
The Doe decision, by invoking the elevated protections under the Alaska 
Constitution and expressing the duty to turn to it before the Federal Con-
stitution, represents an excellent application of the Baker Doctrine. 
Another example of greater personal freedom being afforded under 
Alaska’s state constitution is the decision in Swanner v. Anchorage 
Equal Rights Comm’n.100 In Swanner, the court recognized that the 
wording of the free exercise of religion clauses in both the state and fed-
eral constitutions were identical.101  However, the court announced that 
it would apply and interpret the Alaska Constitution without being con-
strained by federal precedent, stating that it could reach a finding that 
would “provide greater protection to the free exercise of religion under 
the state constitution than is now provided under the United States Con-
stitution.”102 This decision is notable since it provides guidance to the 
Alaska courts to analyze constitutional issues independently without be-
ing constrained by federal precedent, even if the constitutional language 
is similar or identical. 
One of the preeminent areas in which state constitutional law ex-
ceeds federal constitutional law pertains to the individual right of pri-
vacy.  Unlike the Federal Constitution, the Alaska Constitution contains 
an express textual protection for privacy rights.103  As the Alaska Su-
preme Court noted in Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Mun. 
of Anchorage:104 
Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on individual 
liberty, enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly 
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States Consti-
 
 99. Id. at 404 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 100. 874 P.2d 274, 280–81 (Alaska 1994). 
 101. Id. at 280. 
 102. Id. at 281. 
 103. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 104. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001). 
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tution, it can only be concluded that the right is broader in scope than 
that of the Federal Constitution.105 
Accordingly, because the Alaska Constitution expressly mandates the 
protection of individual privacy rights, the state legislature is often cir-
cumscribed, if not prohibited altogether, from enacting legislation that 
intrudes into this right, even though such legislation may not be violative 
of federal constitutional standards.106  Thus, Alaska courts have invali-
dated, on state constitutional grounds, legislative attempts to restrict 
abortions,107 laws attempting to criminalize drug use in the privacy of 
one’s home,108 voting right restrictions,109 and attempted restrictions on 
the right to a jury trial.110 
In Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,111 the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska constitution provides a 
heightened right to reproductive choice: 
[O]ur articulation of the protection of reproductive rights under 
Alaska’s constitution may be broader than the minimum set by the 
federal constitution . . . .Our prior decisions support the further con-
clusion that the right to an abortion is the kind of fundamental right 
and privilege encompassed within the intention and spirit of Alaska’s 
constitutional language.112 
Thus, to some degree, the national debate over the validity and continu-
ing viability of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade113 is of minimal importance in Alaska, as the Alaska Supreme 
Court has rested its holdings on independent state constitutional 
grounds.  By doing so, the state court has kept the promise of dual sov-
ereignty and federalism. 
Another example of Alaska’s assertion of independent state consti-
tutional doctrine is the right to privacy as it relates to access to records.  
The reasoning in Matter of A.B.114 is illustrative.  In Matter of A.B., the 
court compared both federal and state constitutional privacy standards, 
 
 105. Id. at 550 (Alaska 2001) (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 514–15 (Alaska 
1975)). 
 106. Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 
(Alaska 1997) (“[The Alaska Constitution] provides more protection of individual pri-
vacy rights than the United States Constitution.”). 
 107. Id. at 968. 
 108. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 514–15 (Alaska 1975). 
 109. Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1982) (finding a voting law violative of 
the state constitution but not violative of the Federal Constitution, and striking down vot-
ing law requiring three percent of voter signatures for candidates). 
 110. Loomis Elect. Prot., Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Alaska 1976). 
 111. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
 112. Id. at 967–68. 
 113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 114. 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990). 
VAN FLEIN.DOC 12/9/2004  11:49 AM 
250 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [21:2 
applied both standards to the facts then pending, and grounded its hold-
ing in both constitutions.115  The court explained: 
In analyzing asserted constitutional rights of privacy, the applicable 
legal principles are as follows.  The federal right of privacy derives 
from a broad reading of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, or from “emanations” from other constitutional provi-
sions.  The right to privacy in Alaska is expressly guaranteed by arti-
cle I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, which states in relevant 
part: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed.” 
Although neither federal nor state rights of privacy are absolute, it is 
part of the judicial function to ensure that governmental infringements 
of privacy are supported by sufficient justification. Under federal 
precedent it must be found that the privacy invasion is necessary to a 
compelling state interest, and that the governmental regulation does 
not sweep too broadly. Under the Alaska Constitution, the required 
level of justification turns on the precise nature of the privacy interest 
involved. In absence of a suspect classification or impairment of a 
fundamental right, we have required that there be a “fair and substan-
tial relation” between the means chosen and a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose. Where fundamental rights are at stake, the State’s interest 
in invading privacy must be compelling.  Thus, to determine the va-
lidity of the release order, we must consider both the nature and the 
extent of the privacy invasion, and the strength of the state interest in 
requiring disclosure.  The release order at issue here survives constitu-
tional attack under either standard.116 
The result in Matter of A.B. was correct; the analysis, however, un-
necessarily considered both federal and state constitutional standards.  
Since the state constitutional standard protecting the right to privacy is 
broader than the federal standard, any discussion of the federal standard 
is pure dicta.  It is not necessary for the state courts to address the federal 
standard in a right to privacy case other than to note that the Alaska con-
stitutional standard is more protective of individual rights than federal 
law.  A risk exists that the courts may be co-opted by federal precedent, 
even when simply using that precedent as a model.117  Accordingly, state 
 
 115. Id. at 621. 
 116. Id. (citations omitted). 
 117. In Whalen v. Hanley, 63 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2003), the Alaska Supreme Court ad-
dressed “[l]egislative immunity under Alaska’s constitution” but noted that Alaska’s 
provision is “patterned after the federal speech or debate clause,” and therefore, the court 
“looked to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of federal im-
munity as a model for determining the scope of legislative immunity under Alaska’s 
constitution.”  Id. at 258. The court then essentially parroted the federal precedent and 
ascribed its meaning as the intended meaning of the state constitution. Id. However, in 
Kerttula v. Abood, 686 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1984), the court carefully evaluated the two 
comparable provisions, including a textual difference, and explained that the “only dif-
ference which was specifically identified by the framers between the Alaska and Federal 
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courts should vigilantly scrutinize the basis of federal precedent before 
applying that interpretation to a state constitutional provision.  To the ex-
tent that Alaska “[s]tate courts are not necessarily bound by the United 
States Supreme Court’s decisions when they consider issues of state 
constitutional law,”118 it is superfluous to analyze federal law when the 
decision can be grounded in state law alone.  Further, by grounding a 
decision, even in part, upon federal law, the state courts risk review and 
reversal by a federal court. 
The right to a jury trial has also received emphasis under the Alaska 
Constitution.  Justice Jay Rabinowitz explained that the “Alaska Consti-
tution is the source of the right to a jury trial.”119 Attempts to modify or 
restrict this right by the legislature traditionally have been closely scruti-
nized and typically found invalid—that is until recently.  The right to a 
jury trial had been considered the cornerstone of Alaska’s civil and 
criminal justice systems, and the protection of this right exceeds federal 
constitutional minimums: “The Alaska Supreme Court has held that the 
right to jury trial guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the Alaska Con-
stitution is broader than the corresponding right to jury trial guaranteed 
by the Federal Constitution.”120  It is well established that “the trial 
jury’s role as finder of fact is one of the fundamental aspects of Ameri-
can jurisprudence.”121  Accordingly, any action that infringes upon this 
right will be closely examined. 
A decision that represents an anomaly, however, is the plurality de-
cision in Evans v. State.122  In Evans, the plurality upheld legislative re-
strictions on the right to a jury in the civil context by affirming damages 
caps.123  Whereas prior case law established the primacy of jury verdicts 
and respect for jury decisions, by affirming limitations on jury awards, 
the plurality undermined the traditional respect the constitution had en-
shrined for jury verdicts.  Evans may best be viewed as a nod to political 
expediency as opposed to any doctrinal change in the constitutional 
standing of the right to a jury trial and in the jury’s previously unfettered 
domain to render a verdict consistent with the law and its judgment. 
 
Constitutions pertains to the in-session limitation in our document.  This limitation is not 
relevant to this case.”  Id. at 1201–02.  The courts have therefore established that even 
when using federal precedence on a similar provision, they will be careful to distinguish 
any textual differences that could mandate a different result. 
 118. Doe v. State, 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004). 
 119. Vinson v. Hamilton, 854 P.2d 733, 740 (Alaska 1993) (Rabinowitz, J. dissent-
ing). 
 120. Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266, 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000). 
 121. Id. 
 122. 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002). 
 123. Id. at 1070. 
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B. The Alaska Constitution Provides Greater Protections for Criminal 
Procedural and Substantive Rights 
In the area of criminal law, a number of Alaska cases provide simi-
larly notable examples of holdings based on state constitutional law.  For 
example, the Alaska Supreme Court has construed the due process rights 
afforded prisoners in disciplinary proceedings under the Alaska Consti-
tution in excess of the federal constitutional standards.124  As the court in 
Brandon v. Department of Corrections125 explained: 
A comparison of the relevant holdings of this court and the United 
States Supreme Court in the area of prison disciplinary proceedings 
shows that we have interpreted the due process guarantee under the 
Alaska Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the identical provision of the United States Con-
stitution.126 
 Other decisions likewise have turned to the Alaska Constitution and 
given it independent application.  In Beavers v. State,127 the court held 
that Alaska’s state constitutional right against self-incrimination, which 
bars the use of confessions obtained by police threats, was “more de-
manding than federal constitutional law.”128  The Beavers court noted 
that federal constitutional law employs a “totality of circumstances” 
standard in determining whether a confession was obtained in violation 
of a suspect’s right against self-incrimination, and this standard may 
permit confessions obtained in the presence of police threats.129  Reject-
ing this approach, the Beavers court expressly rested its ruling on article 
I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.130 
Individual rights have been enhanced under state constitutional law 
in other areas of criminal law.  The Alaska Court of Appeals in State v. 
Gonzalez131 explained that the “Alaska Constitution’s unique concern 
with the rights to liberty and privacy, and the Alaska Supreme Court’s 
vigilant enforcement of these rights” result in stronger individual protec-
tions under the Alaska Constitution.132  As a result, criminal defendants 
have broader search and seizure protections133 than those available solely 
 
 124. See Brandon v. Dep’t of Corrs., 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003); McGinnis v. Ste-
vens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975). 
 125. 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003). 
 126. Id. at 1234. 
 127. 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000). 
 128. Id. at 1046. 
 129. Id. at 1045. 
 130. Id. at 1046. 
 131. 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
 132. Id. at 933. 
 133. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14 (providing that that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreason-
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under the Federal Constitution.134  In addition, Alaska defendants have a 
constitutional right to counsel at the pre-indictment line-up stage of a 
criminal prosecution, unlike under federal law.135 
C. Alaska’s Equal Protection Standard Is More Favorable to Individual 
Protection than the Federal Standard 
Alaska courts have also developed a more demanding level of scru-
tiny for purposes of minimal constitutionality under the State’s equal 
protection clause.  The Alaska Court of Appeals in Maeckle v. State136 
recognized the irrelevance of federal standards when determining equal 
protection under Alaska law and reasoned that for “purposes of deciding 
Maeckle’s claim, [the court] need consider only the Alaska Constitution, 
since our supreme court has interpreted Alaska’s equal protection and 
due process clauses more broadly than the federal courts have construed 
parallel provisions of the United States Constitution.”137  When review-
ing state legislative enactments for compliance with the minimal re-
quirements of equal protection, the state court has heightened its applica-
tion of “minimal scrutiny” under its sliding scale analysis beyond the 
mere “rational basis test” applied under federal constitutional standards.  
As the Alaska Supreme Court explained: 
 
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated.  No warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
In at least one circumstance, where the state court has followed federal precedent in 
construing a similar state constitutional provision, even if the federal courts subsequently 
reduce the constitutional protections previously established, the state courts have re-
mained steadfast in keeping the prior, broader standard, but then shifting the basis of the 
decision to the state constitution.  An example of this occurred in State v. Jones.  706 
P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985).  In Jones, the court refused to abandon the Aguilar-Spinelli test 
it had previously adopted.  Id. at 322.  Originally set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court, the test requires that a warrant for search and seizure must establish both an in-
formant’s basis of knowledge and his veracity.  Id.  Despite the fact that the United 
States Supreme Court had since abandoned the heightened protections of the Aguilar-
Spinelli test, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the test and its incorporation into the state 
constitution under the article I, section 14 search and seizure provision.  Id.  This again 
emphasizes both the state courts’ vigilance in protecting individual rights notwithstand-
ing fluctuations from the federal courts and the necessity of grounding decisions in state 
law in the event the federal courts alter their standards. 
 134. See Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. 
State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977). 
 135. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 643 (Alaska 1977). 
 136. 792 P.2d 686 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
 137. Id. at 688 (citing Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Alaska 1984)) (empha-
sis added). 
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Minimal scrutiny under our state constitution may be more demand-
ing than under the federal constitution. As under the federal constitu-
tion, the challenged exclusion must be designed to achieve a “legiti-
mate” governmental objective; however, the exclusion must bear a 
“fair and substantial” relationship to the accomplishment of the le-
gitimate objective under state law whereas the relationship under fed-
eral law need only be “rational.”138 
What is notable about Alaska’s higher level of minimal scrutiny is 
that nothing in the text of the Alaska Constitution appears to mandate a 
more exacting standard.  Instead, this scrutiny is mandated only by the 
court’s interpretation of the general intent of the state constitution.  In 
holding that, at a minimum, legislation “must bear a ‘fair and substan-
tial’ relationship to the accomplishment of the legitimate objective,” the 
court implicitly concluded that such an interpretation resonated with the 
spirit and intent of the Alaska Constitution.139  In addition, the state court 
reviewed federal law in this regard and simply found it constitutionally 
unjustifiable to require that only a “rational” basis be met before the leg-
islature may distinguish among citizens.140  Thus, the Stanek and Maek-
cle decisions represent excellent examples of Alaska courts fulfilling the 
promise of dual federalism and giving vigor to the state constitution. 
D. Takings Requirements under the Alaska Constitution Exceed Fed-
eral Standards 
An important area in which a material textual difference between 
the state and federal constitutions exists pertains to takings.  Under the 
Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, the government need only pay 
damages for a taking when property has been taken or impacted to such 
an extent that it has no useful economic value.141  The Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides: “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”142  The Alaska Consti-
tution, on the other hand, contains a provision that requires the govern-
ment to reimburse a property owner even if the property is simply “dam-
aged” by government actions or regulations.143  The state Takings Clause 
provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for pub-
 
 138. Stanek v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 81 P.3d 268, 272 (Alaska 2003) (quoting 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 143. Balough v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245, 265 (Alaska 2000) 
(“The inclusion of the term ‘damage’ in the Alaska Constitution affords the property 
owner broader protection than that conferred by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.”) (quoting Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993)). 
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lic use without just compensation.”144  Alaska courts have appropriately 
determined that this textual difference is both material and substantial; 
federal takings jurisprudence therefore provides limited guidance to the 
state courts. 145 
Unlike federal courts, Alaska courts “liberally interpret Alaska’s 
Takings Clause in favor of property owners, whom it protects more 
broadly than the federal Takings Clause.”146  Moreover, the Alaska Tak-
ings Clause protects not only real property, but it extends to personal 
property and services or labor as well.147  In addition, the state constitu-
 
 144. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (emphasis added); see also Sandberg, 861 P.2d  at 
557 (stating that “[t]his clause is interpreted liberally in favor of the property owner”); 
State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 736 (Alaska 1987) (finding that the inclusion of “the term 
‘damage’ in the Alaska Constitution affords the property owner broader protection than 
that conferred by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution”). 
 145. This is not universally true, however.  For example, in State Dep’t of Natural 
Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg. Corp., 834 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1991), the Alaska Supreme Court 
examined only federal takings jurisprudence when deciding whether the state had taken 
property pertaining to oil drilling data.  Id. at 139.  The court relied on federal law, and 
explained that “[i]n deciding this case we follow the approach taken by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000 (1984).”  Id. at 138.  
The court was cognizant that it had “previously held that the term ‘damages’ affords the 
property owner broader protection than that conferred by the Fifth Amendment.”  Id.  
The court, however, concluded that “the difference between Alaska’s takings clause and 
the federal clause is irrelevant to this case.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, the 
court failed to provide any analysis justifying its conclusion that the difference between 
the two provisions was immaterial.  Further disappointing is the fact that the court poten-
tially could have reached the same conclusion construing only the state constitution. 
Another notable example of the court failing to adhere to its separate analysis and 
unique text under the Alaska Constitution is the decision in 0.958 Acres, More or Less v. 
State, 762 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1988).  In that case, the court relied on federal standards to 
conclude that the taking of a section of property that indisputably affected access to the 
remaining parcel was minimal and thus not compensable, ignoring the fact that the 
Alaska Constitution requires some compensation for any “damage” to a property interest.  
Id.  The court held: “If the remaining access is reasonable, then the mere diminution of 
prior access does not amount to a taking or damage of a cognizable property interest 
such as would require compensation under the federal or state constitution.”  Id. at 101. 
The court further explained: “Government activity in pursuit of social goals often has a 
detrimental effect upon the value of some real property.  Unless this detriment rises to 
the level of a ‘taking’ or ‘damage’ within the meaning of art. I, section 18 of the Alaska 
Constitution, however, there is no right to compensation.”  Id. (quoting Triangle, Inc. v. 
State, 632 P.2d 965, 969 (Alaska 1981)).  This reasoning borders on equating the federal 
standard to the state standard and in the process rendering the “or damage” clause imma-
terial. 
 146. Waiste v. State, 10 P.3d 1141, 1154 (Alaska 2000) (noting that unlike the federal 
clause, Alaska’s Takings Clause mentions “damage[ ]” as well as “tak[ing]”). 
 147. Id. 
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tion takings section “ensures compensation for temporary as well as 
permanent takings.”148  Moreover, resting on the text of the Alaska Tak-
ings Clause, the courts have rejected federal court decisions, or what 
they term as “traditional rules,” “that do not comport with the primacy of 
full compensation, measured from a property owner’s perspective, and 
with economic reality.”149  Additionally, under Alaska law, the “objec-
tive of just compensation is to place the property owner ‘as fully as pos-
sible in the same position as he was in prior to the taking of his prop-
erty.’”150  This restoration to full economic health, no matter how minor 
the harm or “damage,” finds no counterpart in federal takings law.151  In 
light of all the foregoing, the three-factor test used by federal courts to 
determine whether government action effects a taking, including (1) “the 
character of the governmental action,” (2) “its economic impact,” and 
(3) “its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations,” is 
not the model generally followed in Alaska.152 
When viewed as a whole, the Alaska courts have appropriately and 
substantially created an independent takings doctrine based exclusively 
on the Alaska Constitution and the textual difference between the Alaska 
Constitution and the Federal Constitution.  In this regard, the courts have 
assisted in the preservation of the dual federalist structure and strength-
ened the autonomy of the state. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Alaska courts have made many notable inroads along the path of 
establishing an independent body of state constitutional law, and in so 
doing, have promoted and fulfilled the promise of dual federalism.  The 
Alaska courts have given life to the state constitution, particularly where 
textual differences exist, and established a truly separate body of state 
law.  This is particularly noteworthy in the areas of individual rights and 
liberty and takings.  The courts’ creation of independent state law fulfills 
the intent of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, who envisioned 
strong and independent states that worked together on issues of national 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing Stewart & Grindle, Inc. v. State, 524 P.2d 1242, 1246–47 (Alaska 
1974) (approving and adopting New Jersey’s “provocative departure from established 
precedent” in developing “analysis sensitive to the economic realities of public condem-
nation” and adopting the court’s analysis in State v. Nordstrom, 54 N.J. 50 (1969)). 
 150. Ehrlander v. Dep’t of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, 797 P.2d 629, 633 (Alaska 
1990) (quoting Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 150 (Alaska 1971)). 
 151. Also, the heightened takings analysis under the Alaska Constitution applies “not 
only to ordinary eminent domain proceedings, but to actions in inverse condemnation.” 
Ehrlander, 797 P.2d at 633 (citing State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 733 (Alaska 1987)). 
 152. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). 
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importance, but maintained their own powers to govern as each state saw 
best. 
Alaska courts have produced some notable failures as well, not ad-
dressed here in detail, but best represented by the plurality’s decision in 
Evans v. State.153  The plurality in Evans ignored the state constitution’s 
more exacting standard in favor of what appears to be a political com-
promise, rather than basing the decision on a principled legal analysis.154  
However, it is rare for the Alaska Supreme Court to neglect the well-
recognized protections of individual liberty and access to the courts un-
der the state constitution, and the Evans decision may not withstand the 
test of time.  If it does, it may well remain as a monument of what to 
avoid in future cases. 
On the whole, the Alaska courts have succeeded in developing a 
body of independent state constitutional law.  It appears likely that the 
unique features of the state constitution will continue to be given life and 
meaning, making it a primary document governing Alaskans, not just a 
symbol.  In light of the United States Supreme Court’s invigoration of 
federalism and state sovereignty, the state courts in Alaska are presented 
with an opportunity to further establish Alaska’s role as a sovereign 
within a federalist system. 
 
 
 153. 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002). 
 154. Id. at 1070. 
